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This paper is a study of human concept formation and machine pat-
tern recognition. The first three chapters deal with definition of terms, 
a review of the research being undertaken in the area of computer simula-
tion, and the purpose of such research. In the following chapters a 
machine model of pattern recognition is constructed and a model of human 
concept formation is afterwards based on this. The hypotheses set forth 
in the human model are empirically tested using human subjects and the 
findings of this experiment conclude the report. 
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Learning is an arboriform stratification of guesses about the 
world. New guesses or new concepts (new patterns) are essentially 
simple combinations of words which form the patterns that have already 
been learned or that are inherent. In a large sense, learning is the 
1 
evolution of patterns and the first steps are the hardest. 
Patterns are amazingly complicated things to come to grips with. 
Even a consensus of what we mean by the word "pattern" is lacking, but 
a growing number of people are beginning to feel that many of the central 
problems of behavior, intelligence and information processing are prob-
2 lems that involve patterns. 
The study of patterns is the study of complexes--of structures, 
interactions, grammars and syndromes. We find patterns not only in 
visual and other sensory stimuli but also in language and other symbols, 
in assessments and diagnoses and, in general, in descriptions of any 
complex domain. 
A pattern is equivalent to a set of rules for recognizing it, and 
the pattern is determined by these rules rather than vice versa; how-
ever, the redundancy of the world is not always tailor-made to the lan-
1oliver G. Selfridge, "Pattern Recognition and Learning," Information 
Theory, ed. Colin Cherry (New York, 1956), p. 349. 
2 
Leonard Uhr, Pattern Recognition (New York, 1966), p. vii. 
1 
2 
guage in which the rules must be stated. 3 
Now what about the term "recognition"? Hake (1957) says, "About 
the process of recognition itself little is known. We know little 
about the stimulus conditions which influence accuracy of recognition 
4 or evoke recognition responses." However, to be a bit more specific, 
recognition can refer to tasks in which the subject indicates whether 
or not he has seen the stimulus before. 
From the above it should be realized that there is no clear-cut 
understanding, let alone definition of pattern recognition per~· 
However, it can be concluded that by pattern recognition is meant the 
extraction of the significant features from a background of irrelevant 
detail, or classifying a set of data into the learned categories whereby 
"learning" is meant acquiring feasible operational definitions of the 
categories. 5 Thus learning and pattern recognition are complementary. 
The word "significant" in the above is very important. Significance 
is a function of first, context, and second, experience. Now, of course, 
context is a function of experience, and the shape of a pattern is 
recognized with the help of its context. But more than this, experience 
alone affects the kind of thing we regard as significant. 6 In this 
way, the whole process of pattern recognition is inevitably tied up with 
3selfridge, p. 345. 
4Leonard Uhr, "The Development of Perception and Language Simulated 
Models," Computer Simulation of Personality, eds. S. Tomkins and S. 
Messick (New York, 1963), p. 232. 
5selfridge, p. 345 • 
. 6.oliv.er G. Selfridge, "Pattern Recognition and Modern Computers," 
Proceedings Ef ~ Western Joint Computer Conference (Los Angeles, 1955), 
pp. 91-93. 
3 
ways of determining significance. This, I might add, is normally the 
distinction made between man and machine: that man can learn by expe-
rience to extract and deal with the significant things, and a machine 
cannot. Selfridge (1955) does not believe it is a valid distinction, 
since the machine must extract the essential or significant characters 
of the configuration in order to recognize the pattern to which it 
belongs and, this involves a certain amount of learning or experience 
on the part of the machine program. 
Human readers rely heavily on the redundancy of the language, and 
therefore on the use of context. This operates, in the case of script, 
at the letter, word, and sentence level, and frequently beyond. In 
addition, the individual characters of a given script style are evaluated 
and used in the reading process. Any recognition system should there-
fore take account of context though necessarily at a simple level. 7 
Pattern recognizers are concerned with discriminating one out of a 
large number of specified signals and such recognizers are designed to 
function in a context where the set of alternatives is known--the letters 
of the alphabet, the phonemes of English speech--and the machine's job 
is to categorize each particular input as one of the known alternatives. 8 
There may well be an infinite number of different particular 
examples of a chair or face. The different examples may be similar to 
one another in certain well-defined respects, as in the case of an infi-
nite set of straight lines, or fairly similar to one another in certain 
71. S. Frishkopf and L. D. Harmon, "Machine Reading of Cursive 
Script," Information Theory, ed. Colin Cherry (Washington, 1961), p. 300. 
8 
Bert F. Green, Digital Computers in Research (New York, 1963), 
p. 210. 
4 
ill-defined respects, as in the case of the capital letter A as written 
by different people. 
The interesting problems come when the procedure that tells the 
recognizer how to decide whether a particular example is a member of 
one or another of the alternative possible classes is not known. That 
is, the interesting problem is a problem of induction hypothesis--forma-
tion, learning and concept attainment. Almost all natural patterns are 
not even describable. The pattern recognizer must be able to learn; in 
fact, its basic job is to learn general concepts on the basis of specific 
examples--to perform inductions and even to form the hypotheses that 
the inductive evidence provides from specific examples. 9 
Pattern recognition studies have often been closely associated with 
concept formation experiments, and in most respects they are alike. 
The pre-code of the stimuli is the main difference in these experiments. 
Pattern recognizers usually accept stimuli coded into projections on a 
grid. The result is a string of bits, each bit representing the presence 
or absence of illumination on some part of the grid. 
It is difficult to define what a concept is if one wants it to be 
more than mere generalization learning. One possible definition is the 
following. A person has a concept if he has disposition on the basis of 
which he can make nominal classification statements or responses. It 
is assumed that the disposition is learned from a number of instances 
which vary among themselves; and that the response can also be made to 
instances other than those contained in the set on which the concept 
was learned. It is also assumed that the classifications response is 
9uhr, Pattern Recognition, p. 3. 
5 
not the only possible one. If all this is included in the definition, 
then "having a concept" implies that the one has more than one concept, 
l•t . 1· 1 lO imp ies a conceptua system. 
In perception, we are becoming aware that we not only need to keep 
track of the probability of correct recognition but should also pay 
particular attention to the kinds of errors which are made, Perceptual 
learning is an unsolved problem, in both psychology and "artificial 
intelligence," and it is also a reasonable place to begin when one hopes 
11 to develop "higher" processes in a more complex system. 
Such attention will become increasingly important when someone 
makes a serious attempt to simulate human pattern recognition on a 
computer. The experimentation and theory building and modification which 
is being undertaken today is rapidly building what appears to be the 
first relatively firm and meaningful theoretical structure for the sci-
ence of higher mental processes, i.e., for pattern or form perception. 12 
This paper will approach the problem of pattern recognition and 
concept formation from two sides, First, we shall examine a pattern 
recognition model designed for a machine and after this build a human 
model based on this computer model and, subsequently, test the hypothesis 
set forth. These hypotheses are that people recognize patterns in a 
manner similar to that suggested by the computer model, that is, on the 
10 
. John P. Van de Geer .and Joseph M. Jaspars, "Cognitive Functions, 11 
Annual Review of Psychology, 1966, eds, Farnsworth, McNemar and McNemar 
( 196 6) , p. 14 9, 
11uhr, Computer Simulation of Personality, p. 265. 
12 
Leonard Uhr and Charles Vossler, ·~ Pattern Recognition Erogram 
that Generates, Evaluates, and Adjusts its Own Operators," Computers 
and Thought, eds. Feigenbaum and Feldman (New York, 1963), p. 268. 
6 
basis of probability, and the combination of distinguishable features in 
the pattern. This will be tested with people as subjects using the pat~ 
terns adopted in the human model in Chapter V. However, before such an 
attempt is made the following chapter will discuss current research in 
this area, and the chapter after this will examine the purpose and the 
implications of this research. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND THE LITERATURE 
The large body of pattern recognition research that has arisen in 
the past ten years in the inter-disciplinary area between psychology, 
psychiatry, mathematics, engineering, and physiology that is variously 
called "cybernetics," "artificial intelligence," "system sciences," 
"communication sciences," and "information-processing sciences," among 
other names, has been largely concerned with a particular simplified 
version of the general problem of perception and pattern recognition. 13 
The bulk of the research has been on recognition of letters of the 
alphabet and, occasionally, other visual patterns. Most of the rest of 
the work has been on the recognition of spoken words or phonemes. A 
scattering of studies has examined recognition of other arrays including 
Morse code and diagnostic symptoms. 
Virtually all of this research handles the problem of naming a 
static, isolated matrix whose primitive symbols are discrete and clearly 
distinguishable. This primitive set of symbols usually contains only 
the two values "black" and "white"--( 11 0 11 and 111 11 ) in the case of visual 
patterns or a small range of intensities in the case of auditory patterns. 14 
Several models for pattern or shape recognition have been described 




without using a programmed computer as the actual physical embodiment 
of the pattern recognizing model, Most of these were prior to the 
arrival of the computer, because computers have been sufficiently large 
to embody such a model only since about 1957. Some of these have served 
as sources for programmed models either peripherally--Hebb (1949), and 
McCulloch and Pitts (1947)--or quite directly, as in the case of Deutche 1 s 
(1955) papers. 
A great many models for pattern recognition have been programmed--
mostly since 1959. They embody a wide range of approaches to the prob-
lem--from detailed idealized templates and other representations of 
images, and from statistical sampling, factor analytic, information 
theory, to Gestalt-like integrative attempts to isolate and examine 
meaningful properties and characteristics and the interrelations between 
them. 
All these studies were focused on the recognition of letters of the 
alphabet, and often no explicit statement was made as to the relevance 
of the program as a model of human recognition. This has led many people 
to assume that there is a rigid line between simulated modeling of psy-
chological processes on the one hand and "artificial intelligence" on 
the other. But this is really a very superficial dichotomy based chiefly 
on whether the individual and his society choose to call him a "behavioral 
scientist" or an "engineer," "mathematician" or "computer scientist. 1115 
Attneave and Arnoult (1956) were among the first to pose the problem 
of the recognition of sensory patterns in terms clear and precise enough 
to point toward experimental examination. Their paper was written just 
15rbid,, p. 291. 
as the results of the first computer programs were being published and 
they were among the first to recognize the significance of such work 
for psychology. Although they did not specify completely and program 
their own ideas on the subject, they gave in this paper a number of 
stimulating suggestions for mechanisms for pattern recognition. 16 
Actually some of the literature on cognition, specially as it 
relates to concept formation, reorganization of information, and the 
9 
discovery and learning of structures (for example, grammar) is at least 
pertinent to the problem of pattern recognition as is much of the liter-
ature on perception. Indeed, it turns out that the concept learning 
experiments of Hovland (1960), Bruner (1956) and others, when modeled 
via digital computer programs by Kochen (1961), Hunt and Denton (1962) 
are formally identical to pattern recognition. This type of concept 
formation asks the subject to examine strings of about 5-8 symbols that 
can really be thought of as strings of binary numbers, made up of the 
two symbols "O" and "l." 
Pattern recognition, on the other hand, asks the subjects to do 
exactly the same thing, except that the string of symbols is much 
larger--on the order of hundreds or thousands. The symbols are arranged 
in a matrix, and the amount of detail that the subject must notice is 
correspondingly smaller. Consequently the models of Uhr and Vossler 
(1961), Roberts (1960), and Selfridge (1959), to name only a few, are 
sufficiently similar to be satisfactory representatives of concept forma-
tion models. Here, in fact, is a very striking example of the ability 
16Fred Attneave and Malcolm D. Arnoult, "The Quantitative Study of 
Shape and Pattern Recognition," Pattern Recognition, ed. Leonard Uhr 
(New York, 1966), pp. 123-142. 
10 
of the precise computer model to pinpoint similarities between disparate 
processes, and to allow for models of much greater generality than 
psychology has been able to achieve in the past. 
Generally speaking, most of the simulations that have been made 
can be put in one of four categories: (1) neural nets, (2) pattern 
recognizers, (3) problem solvers, and (4) language processers. Pattern 
recognition itself can be further classified by the terms template 
matching, analytic, and random. 
The problem of reading printed characters is a clear-cut instance 
of a situation in which the classification is based ultimately on a 
fixed set of "prototypes." The variables involved are either distor-
tions--systematic changes in size, position, orientation, or 11noise 11 
distortions--blurring, grain, low contrast and so on. If this noise is 
not too severe, we may be able to manage the identification by a normal-
ization and template-matching process. 17 
The first step is to remove any differences attributed to size and 
position--this is called normalization. One way to do this is to trans-
form the figure to obtain a certain fixed center of gravity and a unit 
second central moment. 
Once normalized the figure can be compared with templates for the 
prototypes and by means of some measure of matching the best fitting 
template can be chosen. 
The above scheme with its normalization and direct comparison and 
matching criterion is just too limited in conception to be of much use 
in more difficult problems. The template system in fact has negligible 
1-7Marvin Minsky, "Steps Towards Artificial Intelligence," C~~pu·t-ers 




The name "analytic" has been given to methods for perception that 
show the most inunediate promise. These might best be described as the 
methods for abstracting from combinations of basic units particular 
features or qualities of importance, for identifying rather more abstract 
and complex things like edges, ends, curves, angles and slopes--in 
general for analyzing rather than matching. 19 
In the experiments of Uhr the pattern recognizer follows line 
segments while under the control of an assessing sub-routine, until it 
has identified a complete element as one of the 9-bits worth of possible 
elements. It then identifies the next element, stores the relative 
location at which elements touch, and continues until it has completed 
the figure. This description by elements seems almost a "natural" way 
20 of describing figures--specially man-made figures such as letters. 
For example an "A" equals a vertical left and a vertical right 'touching 
at the top, with a horizontal line joining their middles. A "B" is a 
vertical left with top and bottom curved loops, both closed. An "R" 
differs from a "B" in that there is no bottom curved loop. Even hand-
writing when reduced to this sort of element should give standard char-
acterization. 
The letters to be "recognized" are stored in the computer's memory, 
along with their characterization lists--literally, what they look like. 
The computer first searches these lists to find out what to look for--
18Ibid., p. 415. 
19 
Leonard Uhr, "Intelligence in Computers.: The Psychology of Percep-
tion in People and in Machines,'' Behavioral Science, April 1961, p. 179. 
ZOibid., p. 180. 
12 
what types of elements to expect--in the figure it is trying to identify. 
The lists determine the directions in which the computer will search. 
Selfridge in 1955, together with Dineen, published a series of 
papers showing how the very simple functionings such as those that find 
edges, angles and connectivity could be programmed on the computer. In 
1958 Selfridge published another paper giving a general outline for the 
21 organization of a parallel type of model. This stimulated several 
programs that gave specific embodiment of such a model, that is, the 
Morse code program of Gold and Doyle's (1959) letter recognition program. 
Also the recent work of Neisser (1959) on parallel versus serial proces-
sing in humans and of Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and Pitts (1959) on 
detection functioning in frogs were influenced by Selfridge's model. 
This program which Selfridge calls Pandemonium uses the property 
approach to pattern recognition. The property-list scheme, while not a 
very general form of pattern recognition does lend itself nicely to some 
rather straightforward inference schemes. One can treat the separate 
properties as more or less independent evidence for the defined categories. 
A "property" is defined as a two-valued function which divides 
figures into two classes; a figure is said to have or not to have the 
property according to whether the value of the function is 11111 or 110. 1122 
Each cognitive "demon," as Selfridge calls it, is connected to several 
computational demons that examine the properties of the input pattern. 
Each demon examines the data to determine whether his particular property 
.21 .. .Oliver G •. Selfr.idge, "Pandemonium: .. A Par.adigm fo,r. Learning, 11 
Proceedings of 2, Symposium~ Mechanization .£! Thoug~t :processes (London, 
1959), pp. 513-526. 
22M· k 415 ins y, p. • 
13 
exists or not, If it does, that demon produces an output to all the 
cognitive demons to which it is connected. With all the demons report-
ing at the same time pandemonium results, hence the name. 
However, the pandemonium model is very general with no feedback 
since all the properties are examined at the same time, in parallel. 
This approach can be contrasted with the sequential system of decision, 
in which the output of one demon determines which other demons get to 
see the input next. 
It seems certain that an adequate model for 
human pattern recognition will have to include 
both parallel and sequential processing with 
feedback at several levels so that any decision 
initially made can be undone if further results 
clearly show that an error has been made,23 
A variation of the above approaches is the random net system. A 
random net is a large set of similar and simply-acting elements whose 
attributes and interactive connections may be randomly established. 24 
Some of the units are usually designated input, and some output units. 
The units themselves are termed neurons or cells. The underlying inter-
est in random nets is the belief that if the "right" responses are 
rewarded by some "reinforcement" and "wrong" ones discouraged, then the 
net as a whole will organize itself so as to tend to make only correct 
responses, even when they are very complicated. 
The program of Uhr and Vossler (1963) is based on the above and it 
attempts to make as much use as possible of methods for discovery and 
learning by trying to recognize specific examples of pattern sets. 
23 
Green, p. 211. 
24Marvin Minsky and Oliver Selfridge, "Learning and Random Nets," 
Information Theory, ed. Colin Cherry (Washington, 1961), p. 335. 
14 
It "learns" to do this through experience with specific examples, along 
with their correct names; and then it is tested on its ability to recog-
nize different unknown examples that are given unnamed, The measurers, 
or operators, that the program can discover and develop are restricted 
to those that could be performed by nets of neurons and by higher-level 
combinations of these nets. The program attempts to develop its own set 
of operators, rather than having these built-in. The program learns by 
accumulating weightings and success counts for each measurer, developing 
higher level measurers and throwing away bad measurers. Because this 
model did not have a specific set of functions given to it a priori it 
was able to learn to recognize a large variety of different types of 
patterns, including pictures of simple objects, stick figures, cartoons 
and photographs of faces. 
Such learning methods have also been investigated by Kamentsky and 
Liu (1963) and Prather (1964) and in the related areas of concept forma-
tion and verbal learning by Kochen (1961), Hunt (1962) and Feigenbaum 
(1959). 25 
Two other researchers, Bledsoe and Browning (1959), embodied a 
conceptually very simple, logical scheme in a pattern recognition program 
that exhibited a considerable amount of power and, at least in certain 
limited senses, certain abilities to learn to recognize, no matter what 
type of pattern. Pattern recognition of the "whole," that is, Gestalt 
recognition forms the basis of their program. 26 The very essence of the 
25uhr, Pattern Recognition, p. 294. 
26w. W. Bledsoe and I. Browning, "Pattern Recognition by Machine, 11 
Proceedings of the Eastern Joint Computer Conference (Boston, 1959), 
pp. 225-232. 
15 
concept of a "pattern" is that it cannot be chopped up, that it is a 
structure of individual parts whose meaning lies not at all in these 
separate parts but rather in the fact of their structure. 
A program of a very different sort was presented by Grimsdale, 
.Sumner, Tunis and Kilburn (1959). 27 Their model assumes that a pattern 
is a collection of basic strokes (essentially lines of different length, 
slope and curvature), and attempts to build up a description of any 
pattern presented in terms of these basics. They are using characterizers 
quite similar to those that would be suggested by intuition and common 
sense and, indeed, have recently been shown to exist in animals, in the 
experiments of Hubel and Wiesel (1962), and of Lettvin, Maturana, 
McCulloch and Pitts (1959). Several other programs have been coded or 
suggested to embody the same general type of model--Bomba (1959), 
Prather and Uhr (1964), Marrill (1963), Eden and Halle (1961), and 
Narasimhan (1963). 
Roberts (1960) started his research in pattern recognition by 
examining the ability of the "Perceptron" of Rosenblatt (1958). Percep-
tron is a class name for a group of pattern recognition machines which 
can "learn" to discriminate several categories. The Perceptron has three 
distinguishing sets of functional units: (1) sensory, (2) association, 
(3) response units. It is first and foremost a brain model, and the 
program is mainly concerned with investigating the physical structure 
and neuro-dynamic principles which underlie natural intelligence. 28 It 
27R. L. Grimsdale et al., "A System for the Automatic Recognition of 
Patterns," Proceedings of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, Vol. 106, 
Part B, No, 26, March 1959, pp. 210-221. 
28Al · H. 1 L . . h. d A . ( h ice Mary i ton, ogic, Computing Mac ines an utomation Was -
ington, 1963), p. 38. 
16 
is a very general, almost completely unstructured, random collection of 
1 t . '1 . . 1 . h 29 e emen s, s1m1 ar 1n some respects to neurons or s1mp e sw1tc es. 
Theoretical investigation has resulted in some existence proofs as 
to the possibility that there would be some particular random configura~ 
tion among the large sets of possible "perceptrons" that would, given 
enough training, become capable of recognizing interestingly difficult 
30 patterns. Roberts found in his actual computer runs that this was a 
very slow task. Nevertheless, using the same input as Doyle he achieved 
94 percent correct identification. 
29uhr, Pattern Recognition, p. 293. 
30rbid. 
CHAPTER III 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
The notion that a digital computer program could be a model of 
human behavior is a natural outgrowth of a field of engineering endeavor 
that has come to be called "artificial intelligence. 1131 However, "intel-
ligence" is a slippery concept. 
Minsky has offered the following definitions of intelligence: 
"You regard an action as intelligent until you understand it. In ex-
32 plaining, you explain away." "It denotes little more than the complex 
33 of performances which we happen to respect, but do not fully understand." 
Simulation of learning is one of the most interesting potential 
applications of computer simulation techniques, since the ability to 
learn is one of the clear-cut differences between human and machine 
34 
performance. As indicated in the previous chapter, a number of dif-
ferent types of learning procedures are being simulated, one of which is 
the type of learning involved in recognizing patterns imbedded in a 
complex stimulus. It seems a simple thing for a human to respond to a 
31 Bert F. Green, "Computer Models of Cognitive Processes," Psycho-
metrika, March 1961, p. 86, 
32Paul Armer, "Attitudes Toward Intelligent Machines," Computers and 
Thought, eds, Feigenbaum and Feldman (New York, 1963), p. 391. 
33Minsky, Computers and Thought, p. 447. 
34 Carl I. Hovland, "Computer Simulation of Thinking," The American 
Psychologist, November 1960, p. 689. 
17 
18 
triangle as a triangle, whether it is large or small, short or tall, 
tilted or upright, and to distinguish it clearly from a square. But to 
specify rigorously the criteria in such a way that a machine can learn 
to recognize it invariably is quite a job, and the difficulty clearly 
indicates that there is a lot we do not understand about the phenomenon, 
35 
even at the human level where we take the procedure for granted. 
Extensive tool building is a necessary prerequisite for developing 
programs which actually are intended to simulate human behavior in a 
precise way. Most of the work done in the area of computers is allocated 
to more tool building. In one sense, then, computers serve the same 
purpose as mathematical models--in both cases we have conceptual tools 
which do not permit any vagueness and mercilessly bring to light any 
k f 1 . . h" h h · · h h d · d 36 wea ness o conceptua 1zat1on w 1c ot erw1se m1g t ave passe unnot1ce. 
Today psychology has amassed a great number of particular facts as 
to the interactions of the many factors involved in even the simplest 
perceptual acts. But it has not developed anything in the way of a 
coherent theory of how the crucial recognition, toward which the entire 
37 
perceptual process leads, actually takes place. 
Because of the complexity of their problems, the psychologist and 
the neurophysiologist have studied the levels of behavior and neuron 
pathways quite separately and have made few serious attempts to bridge 
the gap between them. When psychological processes are recast into the 
language of information processing as it flows through a computer model, 
351bid. 
36 Van de Geer and Jaspars, p. 163. 
37uhr, Pattern Recognition, p. 366. 
an important link has been made. For the computer, from one point of 
view, is basically a switching network, and a switching network is the 
most degenerate form of nerve net, that is, the process by which a 
computer simulates a transformation of information--no matter how com-
plex--boils down to a tremendously large set of simple, switch-like 
steps. Nerve nets in the brain almost certainly do something far more 
complex than this, but the particular complex processing they perform 
can themselves be modeled as a set of switch-like processes. If we 
assume that the switching net is a fair first model for a nerve net, 
there will be a fairly straightforward interpretation of a computer 
program for the psychological process of pattern recognition at the 
physiological level of nerve nets. 38 
19 
The computer is not restricted to a simple nerve-net interpretation. 
Rather the computer is a very general device that is capable of manipu-
lating anything that is described or presented to it. So any statement 
as to how to go about pattern recognition--i.e., any theory of recogni-
tion at either the psychological or physiological level--could be written 
39 as a computer program. 
Computer simulated models are merely theoretical models of the 
classical sort. The computer is simply the vehicle on which the model 
is written. The program must be as completely and precisely stated as 
a mathematical theorem. This given them the added virtues of clarity 
and consistency--these are two virtues that are far too frequently 
absent in more traditional theorizing in psychology and the behavioral 
. 38rbid., p. 4. 
39rbid. 
20 
. 40 sciences. 
The value of analysis for the psychologist is that often it helps 
to clarify his thinking. If he can express the problem in terms of a 
machine model, then he feels that he has defined his terms scientifically, 
and has eliminated any probable mysticism or magic from his discussion. 
Since psychologists are often unable to make a precise mathematical 
statement they resort to the next best approach to precision--the con-
ceptual model. A model is certainly superior to a purely verbal argu-
ment, although inferior to a complete mathematical theory. 
If we are eventually to understand the capability of high organisms 
for perceptual recognition, generalization, recalling and thinking, we 
h h h f d 1 . 41 must ave t e answers tot ree un amenta questions: (1) How is 
information about the physical world sensed by the biological system? 
(2) In what form is information stored, or remembered? (3) How does 
information contained in storage, or in memory, influence recognition 
and behavior? 
The first question, which is in the area of sensory psychology, is 
the only one for which appreciable understanding has been achieved, It 
is, therefore, of the utmost importance for the theorists to utilize the 
computer program to gain further insight in the latter two unanswered 
questions. The precisely specified and programmed model can also throw 
a great deal of light on what we really must mean by some of the ill-
formulated concepts which we use to paste together our verbal 
40 lb id: , p. 5 . 
41 Frank Rosenblatt, "The Perceptron: A Probabilis.t,ic, Mo.de.l .f.or 
Information Storage and Organization in the Brain," Psy.chological Review, 
November 1958, p. 386. 
h . . 42 t eor1z1ng. 
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Pattern recognition, along with most other higher mental processes, 
is surely complex. The computer program allows us to begin to build 
more complex models and complexity is necessary in a model of a complex 
phenomenon. 
There are at least three reasons for studying pattern recognition: 43 
(1) To improve our understanding of perception and conjunction. (2) 
To develop more interesting "artificial" systems for studying intelligence 
and learning. (3) To develop technologically practicable solutions to 
specific problems. 
The important point is that the machine can be used as a subject 
when it is desirable to vary a factor that cannot be tampered with in 
people (for example, previous experience). 
The concept of comparing the behavior of man and 
machine in an n-dimensional continuum recognizes dif-
ferences as well as similarities. A common argument 
against machine intelligence is that the brain is a 
living thing--the machine is not. In our continuum 
we simply recognize the dimension of living and note 
that machines and men occupy different positions in 
this dimension. It is hoped that the definition of 
research on "artificial intelligence" as an effort 
to push machines further out in the continuum of 
intelligent behavior will reduce some of the semantic44 
difficulties surrounding discussion of such research. 
42uhr, Pattern Recognition, p. 5. 
43 Leonard Uhr and Charles Vossler, "The Search to Recognize," 
Optical Character Recognition, eds. G. L. Fischer et al. (Washington, 
1962), p. 326 • 
.44A rmer, p. 405. 
CHAPTER IV 
A MACHINE PATTERN RECOGNITION PROGRAM 
A pattern recognition model has been tested by Worthie Doyle of 
45 the Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The 
procedure and method used in these experiments will form the basis for 
the human concept formation model in the following chapter. This pattern 
recognition scheme is intended to handle noisy and highly distorted 
data. The input data is subjected to a series of tests, after which a 
decision is reached. The scheme incorporates two notions--a decision 
is reserved until all test results are in, and discrimination is based 
on "learning" from real data. The input data was hand-printed English 
capitals, which can obviously be varied considerably. The program is in 
fact a Pandemonium one with a limited environment of 10 letters, the 
features and attributes of which are not memorized as combinations but 
rather as individual attributes. Our most important aim in each problem 
is the selection of useful items or tests, In each case no single item 
is very effective, while combined information from many items can be 
very effective. 
Doyle split his data into two parts, using one part during the 
learning phase and the other part to test the results of the recognition 
45worthie Doyle, !'Recognition of Sloppy, .Hand".".Printed Characters," 
Proceedings of the Western Joint Computer Conference (San Francisco, 
1960), pp. 133-142. 
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process. There are six levels to the program: (1) input, (2) clean-
up, (3) inspection of attributes, (4) comparison with learned-feature 
distribution, (5) computation of probabilities, and (6) decision. 
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The input stage involves the presentation of a letter to the machine 
which uses a photo cell device to scan the figure and transform it into 
a series of dots on a 32 X 32 matrix. All the cells through which the 
lines of the letter pass are filled in ("one" cells), the remainder 
remain blank ("zero" cells.) 
Thirty attributes of each pattern were examined. Attributes in-
cluded were vertical straight lines, horizontal lines, left, right, upper 
and lower concavities. Others were the maximum number of intersections 
of a vertical or horizontal straight line with the pattern. The computer 
draws the lines through every horizontal row in the matrix and recognizes 
intersections as sequences of "one" cells separated by sequences of 
"zero" cells. The maximum number of intersections being recorded, some 
attributes had two or three possible values while others had as many as 
ten or twenty. 
During the learning phase, the computer determined the values of 
each of the thirty attributes and tallied these results in a set of 
distributions for that character. 
In the table on the following page, the "vertical line" column 
records the maximum number of intersections with the horizontal line. 
Out of five D's, all five have a maximum of' two intersections with the 
straight lines, only one B with three intersections and four with two 
intersections. The probability for each character is in parentheses. 
The probability of a letter having a maximum number of two inter-
sections being a Dis 5/19 or .263, and a Bis 4/19 or .211. 
TABLE I 
FEATURES AND PROBABILITIES FOR MACHINE RECOGNITION 
Vertical Line Horizontal Line Upper Letter 2 intersections 3 1 2 3 Concavity 
B 4 (.211) 1 (1. 00) 0 1 (.084) 4 (1.00) 0 
D 5 (.263) 0 0 5 (.416) 0 0 
v 5 (.263) 0 4 (1. 00) 1 (.084) 0 5 (. 50) 
x 5 (.263) 0 0 5 (.416) 0 5 (. 50) 











After all the samples have been fed into the machine during this 
learning stage, an "unknown" sample is projected onto the matrix. The 
same procedure is followed with horizontal and vertical lines being 
drawn to test for intersections and subsequently the 30 features. 
The test for features is carried out; the maximum number of inter-
sections are noted. Next the machine consults the property distribution 
to determine the likelihood of each letter; entering the estimated 
probabilities in a table. Then the total probabilities are computed for 
each letter. The letter with the highest probability is decided upon. 
Doyle's program achieved about 87 percent success. Human identifica-
tion of the same samples yielded a slightly higher level of success, 
97 percent. 
We might regard this result with a certain amount of apprehension, 
but if we compare the computer's ability to recognize unknown patterns 
with a person who after being totally blind all his life has his sight 
restored, then the machine's achievement is all the more resounding. It 
has been found that such persons have experienced tremendous difficulty 
recognizing relatively simple patterns such as the different features 
on two faces. We must regard the computer as being in a very similar 
position when initially confronted with unknown data. 
Doyle's program can incorporate any attributes that will provide 
additional discriminations. 
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The program is based upon a catch-as-catch-can 
philosophy. Nevertheless, this does not rule it 
out as a basis for a model of perception. Very 
likely human perceivers are able to use whatever 
information they can get about a pattern in a 
catch-as-catch-can fashion.46 
Green, Digital Computers in Research, p. 213. 
CHAPTER V 
A MODEL OF HUMAN CONCEPT FORMATION 
Before attempting to construct a human model for concept formation 
our approach needs clarification, and terms need re-defining. Concepts 
can either be static ot dynamic. We shall focus our attention on the 
static concepts, since these seem to be the earliest concepts formed in 
the human. 47 In other words we are interested in concrete rather than 
abstract concepts. 
Although for a realistic simulation of typical concept learning we 
should include situations where there is characteristic human fallibility 
in memory, we shall avoid such a complication if for no other reason than 
48 
for the absence of it in Doyle's program. 
To agree with our previous approach to machine concept formation it 
would be appropriate to start off with a human brain without any formed 
concepts, that is, a newborn child. When a child is born he comes into 
the world without any idea of what will confront him or what the "picture" 
before him will look like. Owing to a lack of communication, all concepts 
formed by the child will have to be necessarily internal. He will have 
to do all the "thinking for himself." This is the learning stage. He 
will form his own "picture" of a certain pattern and will associate cer-
47 B. Berelson and G. Steiner, Human Behavior (New York, 1964), p. 198. 
48Hugh E. Cahill and Carl I. Hovland, "The. Role .of Memory in Acquisi-
tion of Concepts," Journal£!. Experimental Psychology, March 1960, p. 137. 
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tain features with this pattern, until he is motivated to change this 
relationship. 
"There are two important psychological processes operating in 
learning concepts--generalization and discrimination. Those factors 
h d . . . . f · 1 · f . 1149 u · 1 tat encourage 1scr1m1nat1on ac1 1tate concept ormat1on. nt1 
a person is motivated to discriminate, he shall not be able to form any 
concepts. Generalization tends to restrict the person's ability to 
extend his range of concepts. For example a child having been condition-
ed to fear a white rat will generalize when confronted with a white 
cloth. Once he is able to discriminate between the two on the basis of 
some feature, a white cloth will no longer frighten him. 
Let us now take the case of the child faced with a dog and a cat. 
No doubt the dog has been associated with certain "doglike" features 
guch as the sound he makes. When confronted with a cat for the first 
time, the child will probably recognize it as a dog since it has very 
many "doglike" features--four legs, fur coat, two eyes, etc. All these 
characteristics build up a "doglike" picture in his mind. Confusion 
between dog and cat will result until he is able to find a specific 
feature common to only one--such as the sound either makes. 
What if he is confronted with a third pattern--a bird? This has 
only two legs and no ears and is clearly neither dog nor cat since it 
has very few "doglike" or "catlike" features. He will associate this 
pattern with "birdness." He will now be able to recognize the difference 
between dog and bird or cat and bird, but he will still have trouble 
separating cat from dog--the only really distinguishing feature at this 
49H. Kendler, Basic Psychology (New York, 1963), p. 25. 
early stage being the noise each makes. 
The manner in which these "pictures" are constructed can be sum-
marized by the following: 
All information received by the brain must be 
coded into electric impulses in our sensory nerves, 
and then be reconstructed into a pattern in our 
brain. The "picture" in the brain consists of 
patterns of neural connections. The picture we 
reconstruct inside our heads of the things outside 
are the concepts of those things, which may or may 
not be accurate reconstructions.SO 
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By the process of feature and characteristic inspection the child 
is able to build up concepts of his environment. There is constant 
comparison and checking of the features with information stored. If one 
feature is unrecognizable he will conclude that on the basis of all the 
other features it "must" be a pattern that he has already seen. As 
explained previously, if the child, having learned the features of a 
cat, is confronted with a rabbit he will conclude that on the basis of 
all the features observed it can only be a "funny looking" cat. The 
more cats seen and recognized as such, the higher will be the probability 
that the rabbit is indeed a cat. (Provided that no rabbits are seen.) 
Expanding this probability notion further, that is, that probability 
plays an essential role in the recognition of patterns, we can create a 
model by assuming that at any fixed moment there are a certain number of 
animal features stored in his brain; for example, legs, eyes, ears, coat, 
shape, size, etc. Recognition of the pattern is thus based on these 
features. 
For our purpose let us assume that he sees each of the following 
different animals five times: dog, cat, bird, rabbit and squirrel. A 
50 
Kuhn, p. 36. 
number of features can be associated with each. For simplicity we 
assume that there are only four features to be recognized that will 
account for the identification of the animal, that is, legs--either 
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two or four; ears--either pointed or round; tail--either short or long; 
face--either flat or pointed. 
Having been presented with each animal on five different occasions 
he is able to compute a probability list of how many times each of the 
four features occurred. 
In Table II out of five dogs seen each had four legs; two had 
pointed ears and three had round ears; three had long tails and two had 
short tails; and four had flat faces while one had a pointed face. Each 
animal is classified in the above manner. A probability table is then 
made (figures in parentheses) on the basis of the occurrence of each 
feature in each animal, against the total number of features observed in 
all the animals. For example, the probability that an animal with point-
ed ears is a dog is 2/16 or .126; a rabbit 5/16 or .312, and so on. For 
each feature a probability is worked out. The above is the learning 
stage. 
We are now in a position to present the child with a completely new 
animal (one of the above five) and he must decide what it is. This 
"unseen" animal has four legs, round ears, long tail and a flat face. 
On the basis of previous information and the comparison of features with 
estimated probabilities, Table III results. After the four-feature test 
has been carried out, each outcome is "looked up" in the "stored" proba-
bility table. The estimated probabilities are then entered into a table. 
The probability of each feature occurring is multiplied, and the animal 
with the highest result is chosen. This is necessary; otherwise if added 
TABLE II 
FEATURE AND PROBABILITY 
LEGS EARS TAIL 
Animal 
2 4 Pointed Round Long 
Dog 0 5 (. 250) 2 (.126) 3 (. 750) 3 (.177) 
Cat 0 5 (.250) 4 (. 250) 1 (.250)* 4 (.235) 
Bird 5 (1.00) 0 0 0 5 (.294) 
Squirrel 0 5 (. 250) 5 (.312) 0 5 (.294) 
Rabbit 0 5 (. 250) 5 (.312) 0 0 
Total 5 20 16 4 17 
(Probability of each feature occurring in parentheses.) 
*Assuming one cat has had his ears clipped. 
Short 








4 (.211) 1 (.166) 
5 (.263) 0 
0 5 (.834) 
5 (.263) 0 







Feature Dog Cat Bird Squirrel Rabbit 
4 legs .250 .250 0 .250 .250 
Round ears • 750 • 250 0 0 0 
Long tail .177 .235 .294 .294 0 
Flat face • 211 .263 0 .263 .263 
Total 1.388 .998 .294 .807 .513 
Multipli-
cation .007002 .000798 0 0 0 
the outcome would result in a probability greater than one, and this is 
not possible. Furthermore, identification would be impossible if more 
than one animal had a probability of greater than one. Naturally, an 
animal is immediately eliminated if the probability of any feature 
occurring is zero. However, if this occurs for all the animals and 
since a choice must be made, the total probability for each animal must 
be divided by four, and the animal with the highest probability is chosen 
(for example, 1.388 divided by four). In the above case, the animal 
with the highest "score," is the dog. 
The above might seem very machine-like and cumbersome, but possibly 
the brain does identify patterns on similar lines. The whole operation 
would occur instantaneously, and th~s it might seem feasible. 
As more features are learned, the brain is able to discriminate more 
easily, and the probability of a correct choice being made will be more 
certain. If there is a feature pertaining only to one particular pattern, 
then the probability for that pattern in the feature test will be one; 
and on the basis of this the decision will be certain, since the proba-
bilities for this feature in the other patterns will be zero. 
CHAPTER VI 
METHOD, PROCEDURE AND RESULTS 
The underlying hypothesis is that people recognize patterns on the 
basis of past experience. The more patterns of a certain category seen 
and identified correctly, the more likely an unknown pattern will be 
identified as this pattern rather than as another. 
A second hypothesis is that it is the combination of features rather 
than individual features that enable correct identification. In other 
words, the hypotheses are that people recognize patterns in a similar 
fashion to our computer program, and that they will adopt the method for 
simple animal recognition suggested in the human model of the last chap-
ter. 
Materials 
The stimulus objects were drawings of animals on an 8 X 11 inch 
card. The animals that were used were the same as in the previous model, 
that is, dog, cat, bird, rabbit and squirrel. Each drawing contained the 
four features which would enable recognition. These were: legs--either 
two or four; ears--either pointed or round; face--either pointed or flat; 
and tail--either long or short. Apart from these four variables, all 
other features were identical in all the drawings. 
There were five drawings of each animal, and these drawings contained 
the combination of features as set out in Table II. In other words, all 
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five dogs were shown to have four legs each; two had pointed ears, and 
three had round ears; three had long tails, and two had short tails; 
and four had a flat face while one had a pointed face. The five cats 
had four legs each; four had pointed and one had round ears; four had 
long tails and one had a short tail; and all five had a flat face. The 
five birds had identical features: two legs, no ears, long tail, and 
pointed face. The five squirrels and five rabbits also had identical 
features except for the tail, which was long in the former and short in 
the latter drawings. Apart from this difference both had four legs, 
pointed ears and a flat face. 
In addition to these twenty-five drawings, there were two more: the 
"unknown" pattern and a drawing used for example purposes. The unknown 
sample had the same features as in the previous model, i.e., round ears, 
four legs, long tail and a flat face. The example drawing was that of a 
horse, the four critical features being clearly distinguishable. 
Selection of the Subjects 
The Ss were twenty undergraduate student volunteers from the school 
of business, Oklahoma State University. Each student was tested individ-
ually for half an hour. The testing interviews were spread over two 
consecutive days and were conducted under "suitable" testing conditions. 
Apparatus 
The sequence of stimuli were arranged as a deck of cards and were 
presented manually by E to S. The plastic covered cards were placed 
on a reading stand before each S with each card being replaced by an-
other every twenty seconds. 
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Procedure 
Prior to conducting the test each S was informed of the procedure 
and the instructions to be followed. These were read by E to Sand 
thus the content and presentation of these were uniform for all Ss. S 
was told what four features to look for and during this indoctrination 
the example drawing was shown which gave an indication to S what type 
of stimuli to look for. 
Each class of animal was presented five times, in other words, 
twenty-five drawings were presented during the learning stage, with the 
sequence of presentation being varied for each S. The name of each 
animal was written on the presentation card except on the unknown 
sample. S was told that he could write down any information he wished. 
After the "learning" stage S was asked to identify the unknown 
sample. This he was to do on the basis of what he had already seen, 
taking into account only the four variable features. In order to elimi-
nate pure guessing, which would have yielded a 50 percent "correct'.' 
51 response, S was asked to explain his method of arriving at his decision 
and also to indicate why the alternative choice was not made. It was 
made clear that the sequence of presentation was irrelevant and it was 
also stressed that the four features were the only relevant ones. 
Results 
Table IV exhibits the over-all results obtained from the interviews. 
Of the 20 Ss tested, all suggested that the unknown sample was either 
51Prior to the test the unknown sample was presented to a different 
group of people who were asked to recognize it; at first glance 70 per-
cent claimed it was a cat and 30 percent, a dog. 
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dog or cat. According to the human model the correct response should 
have been dog. The results obtained indicate that there was a 65 per-
cent correct identification. Of these thirteen, five Ss based their 
decision to a large extent on one feature, i.e., ears. Of the five dogs 
seen, three had round ears whereas only one cat with round ears was seen. 
This feature was significant to those Ss and they did indicate that this 
was the overriding feature in their decision although they obviously 
should have taken the other two features--tail and face--into considera-
tion. However, eight did take these two features into account and they 
did compare all the four features and even suggested that although the 
two features of the cat--long tail and flat face--could have influenced 
their decision, the round ears were the major factor for not choosing 
the cat. 
As indicated, seven Ss decided upon the cat to represent the 
unknown sample. Of these six claimed the face was the predominant factor 
in their thinking and, contrary to the dog "choosers," they maintained 
that the face above all else, even the round ears, gave indication that 
it was a cat. 
It is interesting to note that one S decided upon the cat after 
examining all the features. The reasoning was that of the five dogs only 
three had long tails; whereas four cats had long tails, the S then gave 
one point in favor of the cat. The cat gained another point when the 
flat face feature was examined; all five cats had a flat face and only 
four dogs had this feature. However the round ears feature--three dogs 
and one cat--enabled the dog to draw level with the cat. Since each 
animal had four legs this feature did not enter the scrutiny. The final 
choice, although admitted to be a guess by S, did strongly suggest that 
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possibly with more time a probability approach, taking into account the 
features of the bird, rabbit and squirrel (as in our human model), would 
result. 
The method of arriving at a decision was particularly interesting. 
Of those who decided upon the dog, five stated directly that the sample 
was not a cat because the probability of it being a dog was higher. The 
one S who chose a cat on a probability basis must have made an error in 
recognizing a feature on a dog drawing. Leaving aside the latter in-
stance, 25 percent of the Ss made the correct response (according to our 
human model) using probability as the basis for their decision. 
The other major method was the process of elimination. This in-
volved eliminating an animal on the basis of not having one of the fea-
tures that the unknown sample had. The Ss checked each feature system-
atically against the five categories of animals. The bird was eliminated 
immediately since it has only two legs. The tail scrutiny eliminated the 
rabbit, and finally the ears examination put an end to the squirrel's 
chances. This left only the dog and cat, and each feature of the unknown 
animal was possessed by at least one dog and one cat seen in the learning 
phase. The significant difference between this group of Ss as opposed to 
those who adopted the probability approach is that they stopped at this 
point and made up their mind on the basis of the ears feature or combina-
tion of. features. Only one of the Ss who chose the cat used the elimina-
tion system and subsequently based the final decision on the face feature. 
Those Ss recorded under "other" clearly did not make their final 
choice between dog or cat by the elimination of feature process. They 
disregarded the other three animal categories simply because they did 
not resemble or "look like" the unknown sample. These Ss made their 
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final decision on the basis of either the ears or face feature. 
Of the Ss who gave the dog response, all thirteen were certain of 
their decision on the basis of "more likely." On the other hand only 
one, or 14 percent who chose the cat, was certain of his decision on 
the basis of probability. This means that the Ss who gave the "correct" 
response were more sure of their choice than those who made the "incor-
rect" response. Furthermore, this indicates that they did think in 
terms of probability when investigating the ears feature and also that 
the other features, tail and face which were clearly favorable for the 
cat decision, were taken into account and weighed against the overwhelm-
ing ears feature. 
Interpretation of Results 
From the study we can draw many conclusions as to whether or not 
the concept formation process undertaken by individuals follows our 
human model. 
The information obtained indicates that the probability hypothesis 
does not seem very significant; only 25 percent explicitly stated that 
they used this approach, although 65 percent did indicate that they 
were "more sure of their choice." However, the process of elimination 
used by 60 percent of the Ss does resemble the method ·in our human model. 
In this model, the multiplication of probabilities automatically elimina-
ted the animal with one of the features missing. 
A further conclusion is that 55 percent of the Ss based their deci-
sion on only one feature, all the features were obviously not given the 
same weighting. This, I think, might have resulted from past experience. 
The six Ss who relied on the ears feature might have regarded it as 
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inconceivable that a cat, although they had seen one, could have round 
ears. On the other hand those Ss who relied on the face feature made 
their decision on the basis that all cats have flat faces whereas only 
some dogs have a flat face. Obviously the more dogs with flat faces and 
the more cats with round ears seen, the less will be the emphasis placed 
on such unique features. Or to say it in another way, the probability 
that it is a dog or cat will be far less. 
We can also draw the conclusion that in the case of very simple 
stimuli with few features, the combination of features is not as impor-
tant as the individual features themselves. However, as the stimuli 
become more complex the distinction between various features might not 
be easily distinguishable, and in such cases it will be the combination 
of features that will form the concept. 
It seems that all these various characteristics are linked together 
in forming the concept and schemata by which objects are identified. If 
we were to utilize fully our capacity for registering the differences in 
things and to respond to each event encountered as unique, we would soon 
be overwhelmed by the complexity of our environment. The existence of 
discriminating capacities would, if fully used, make us slaves to the 
particular--the resolution is achieved by man's capacity to categorize. 
To categorize is to render distinguishably different things equivalent, 
to group the objects and events and people around us into classes, and 
to respond to them in terms of their class membership rather than their 
uniqueness. Our refined discriminatory activity is reserved only for 
those segments of the environment with which we are specially concerned. 
For the rest we respond by rather crude forms of categorical place-
40 
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ment. The learning and utilization of categories represents one of 
the most elementary and general forms of cognition by which man adjusts 
h . . 53 to 1s environment. It is of immense importance to the individual to 
have a reliable method of differentiating the objects which do or do not 
vary from time to time and, in the case of the latter, of the manner in 
which they may be expected to vary. 
In the case of the computer model, the machine has no way of knowing 
whether a pattern is simple or complex. Consequently, it must establish 
a routine that necessitates the checking of every feature and deciding 
upon an answer on the combination of features, The computer is unable 
to determine which feature carries the most weight unless it has checked 
all of them and refers back to its memory. But it is important to note 
that every feature does carry some weight in the final decision. The 
manner in which some of the Ss arrived at a decision does to some (albeit 
not very much) extent resemble pattern recognition by machine, 
The result obtained, although not "significant" in the usual sense, 
are to some limited degree generalizable to people other than those 
used as Ss, but the degree to which they are generalizable to new stimuli 
remains a matter of conjecture, 
52 
J. S. Bruner, J. J, Goodnow, and G. A. Austin, A Study of Thinking 
(New York, 1956), p. 1. 
53Ibid., p. 2. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been to determine whether human beings 
recognize patterns in the same manner as suggested by a specific computer 
model. This computer model was constructed by Worthie Doyle at the 
Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The program 
identified hand-written English letters on the basis of feature examina-
tion and probability distributions. During the learning stage, named 
patterns were presented to the machine and a memory was constructed 
embracing the features that would account for identification of an 
unknown pattern in the future. A probability distribution was associated 
with each feature, and it was the combination of these probabilities that 
enabled the machine to make the "most likely" choice when presented with 
an unknown sample. 
In order to empirically test the hypotheses that people recognize 
patterns in the same way as the machine model, that is, by probability 
and feature combination, a human model was constructed using the patterns 
of animals instead of letters of the alphabet. Of the five animals 
presented each had four variable features associated with it. During 
the learning phase, a probability distribution for each feature in each 
animal was computed. When the unknown sample was presented, the examina-
tion of the four critical characters, followed by a probability tabula-
tion, resulted in the "most likely" choice being made. 
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This method and procedure of pattern recognition was tested with a 
group of human subjects. The results obtained suggested that when recog-
nizing patterns the various characters are linked together by the indi-
vidual enabling concepts of the pattern to be formed. The actual method 
of final recognition was not determined with any degree of significance, 
however, the results do indicate that the notion of probability does 
enter into the decision-making process, since 100 percent of the Ss who 
made the "correct" response were certain of their choice on the basis of 
likelihood, as against only 14 percent of the Ss who made the "incorrect" 
response. 
The study revealed a number of limitations that became evident 
during the testing of the Ss. Probably the most important was the 
influence of past experience, Although the Ss were told that for recog-
nition they were only to use the data on the drawings, the responses of 
many of the Ss did indicate that previous concepts and knowledge of these 
animals influenced their decision. 
Another limitation was that by verbally questioning the Ss at the 
conclusion of the test, E was unable to penetrate to any great depth to 
extract precise and unambiguous information. On a few occasions Ss 
became suspicious of persistent questioning, consequently their responses 
to the questions were restricted, 
Suitable recommendations to overcome these drawbacks can be made. 
To eliminate past experience biasedness, that is, patterns seen before 
in everyday life, patterns of a "nonsense" nature should be substituted 
for the better known patterns. These patterns would, of course, contain 
variable characteristics as in any sensible pattern, but the pattern as 
such would be meaningless to the individual. Furthermore, to eliminate 
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name association with the pattern, nonsensical names should be attached 
to each of these patterns. In this way the testing environment would be 
the only relevant one and past experience and learning would be nullified, 
A further recommendation is that a printed questionnaire be used 
to elicit S responses. The questionnaire should, of necessity, be objec-
tive in nature and consist of only a two-choice response. In this way 
the S would be forced to answer questions in a specific and unambiguous 
manner. 
Our most precise knowledge of perception is in those areas which 
have yielded to psycho-physical analysis (for example, the perception of 
size, color and pitch) but there is virtually no psychophysics of shape 
or pattern. The arrangement, differentiation and categorization of shapes 
into "configurations" have been the subject of the extensive research of 
h G 1 h 1 . 54 t e esta t psyc o ogists. 
Clearly, we have not yet reached the stage where we can lay claim 
to know everything about the recognition process, consequently by using 
computer simulations some light may be thrown on the problem. Computer 
simulations make possible the study of systems of a complexity far too 
great to be handled by analytic methods, and thus open up for psycholo-
gists the possibility of studying the brain without first hopelessly 
simplifying it. 55 
As has been emphasized, attempts at computer simulation serve an 
important function in the clarification of theories in requiring detail-
representation of psychological processes in a rigorous language. Once 
54 
Attneave and Arnoult, p. 123. 
55Leonard Uhr and Charles Vossler, "The Search to Recognize," Optical 
Character Recognition, eds, G. L. Fischer et al., (Washington, 1962), p. 326. 
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formulated in these terms the actual running of the program on a computer 
can provide information about further implications of the theory and 
about the possible inconsistencies in it. 56 
Once we have managed to perfect a pattern recognition program, 
many previously untestable hypotheses about the human brain will become 
testable using computer models. Consequently, a better understanding 
of the functioning of the human brain will result, It is much easier 
and more precise to test hypotheses on a machine, in which case the 
environment can be rigidly controlled and variables restricted. In this 
manner scientists will be able to break down the field of concept forma-
tion in the human brain into segments, and once these analyses have been 
carried out, they can then piece the puzzle together. 
It is hoped that the research done in this field will help us to 
understand how humans learn patterns by providing additional clues to 
the fundamental mechanisms of human perceptual and conceptual learning. 57 
Undoubtedly the combination of man and computer is capable of accomplish-
ing things that neither of them can do alone. 58 
56uhr, Computer Simulation 2!_ Personality, p. 3. 
57Ibid., p. 232. 
58w._ A. Rosenblith, "What Computers Should Be Doing," Management and 
the Computer of the Future, ed. Martin Greenberger (1962), p •. 313. 
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